This study examined the relationship between children's moral judgments about pretend crying and their understanding of mental states. Thirty-three 6-year-old Japanese children were individually given pretend crying tasks involving a "harm" story and a "harm-free" story, theory of mind tasks, hidden emotion tasks, and a vocabulary test. In the harm story, the protagonist pretended to cry after accidentally being bumped by another character. In the harm-free story, the protagonist pretended to cry because of a purely personal motivation. The results showed that understanding of hidden emotions was correlated with negative judgments about the pretend crying in the harm story, whereas theory of mind was correlated with negative judgments in the harm-free story. The interface between social understanding and morality is discussed.
naki (lying crying) because this kind of expression includes elements common to lying, such as pseudo-expression. Pretend crying is related to many aspects of children's understanding of mind, including hidden emotions (Harris et al., 1986; Pons & Harris, 2000) , theory of mind (Perner & Wimmer, 1985; Wimmer & Perner, 1983) , and morality (Kohlberg, 1969; Piaget, 1932 Piaget, /1965 . Understanding the interface between mental-state understanding and morality is one of the key issues in children's development, and this topic has garnered considerable attention since Piaget's early work (1932 Piaget's early work ( /1965 on moral development (cf. Lee, 2000; Talwar & Lee, 2008) .
Previous research on the development of lying has addressed moral judgments of lying as well as the concept of lying, the production of lies, and the detection of lying (see Lee, 2000 , for a review). As lying and deception are generally considered to be socially and morally negative forms of behavior (Talwar & Lee, 2008) , the way in which children evaluate lying and deception is important. Children's moral understanding of lying and deception emerges during the preschool years (Bussey, 1992 (Bussey, , 1999 Chandler, Fritz, & Hala, 1989; Peterson, Peterson, & Seeto, 1983; Piaget, 1932 Piaget, /1965 Polak & Harris, 1999; Siegal & Peterson, 1998; Talwar, Lee, Bala, & Lindsay, 2002 . With regard to pretend crying, research exploring when and how children become able to discriminate between pretend crying and real crying has concluded that this ability develops between the ages of 4 and 6 years (Mizokawa, 2011b; Mizokawa & Koyasu, 2007) . However, the issue of how they judge the moral nature of their moral judgment regarding pretend crying has not been examined in previous research.
Based on Lee's (2000) speculations about the five features of a speech act, an emotional expression can be characterized by following five features: 1) factuality; 2) surface (apparent) meaning; 3) real meaning; 4) the expresser's intention; and 5) the expresser's belief. Certain combinations of these features result in false emotional expressions, such as pretend crying. In addition to these five features, social convention is also an important factor in children's moral judgments (Lee, 2000) . When people make moral judgments about pretend crying, they may pay attention to these five features and also consider social convention.
Pretend crying is not a factual expression, as it involves dissociation between appearance and reality. Moreover, the expresser intends to show a fake emotion and is aware that his or her crying is not genuine. At around 6 years of age, children can gauge whether crying is genuine based on contextual cues (Mizokawa, 2011b) . Bussey found evidence suggesting that preschoolers' negative evaluation of lies was determined by the falsity of the statement (Bussey, 1992) and that 4-, 8-, and 11-year-old children judged lying as worse than truth-telling when all three types of lies-antisocial, white, and trick lies-were compared with their respective truths (Bussey, 1999) . Hence, pretend crying contains features that can be judged by preschoolers as negative because of the children's awareness of falsity. However, it remains unclear whether this kind of expression by preschoolers is acceptable in terms of social conventions, and this varies across situations. Indeed, children's moral judgments about pretend crying can change as a result of trivial differences in the expresser's motivation (Mizokawa, 2011a) . With regard to judgments based on the motivation for lying, children between 5 and 11 years of age judge self-protective lies more harshly than do adults (Peterson et al., 1983) . Although no research has examined how children judge pretend crying, previous findings suggest that 5-yearold children do not always judge self-protective lies harshly (Mizokawa, 2011a) .
Mizokawa (2011a) investigated 4-and 5-year-olds' understanding of the interpersonal functions of pretend crying using a story-based task. In this experiment, children were shown two stories: a story involving accidental harm (a "harm" story) and a story involving no actual harm (a "harm-free" story). In the harm story, the protagonist cried because s/he was accidentally harmed by another character. In the harm-free story, a different protagonist was personally motivated to cry so as to elicit another person's prosocial behavior. Data from the children who could distinguish pretend crying from actual crying were analyzed. The results showed that younger children, around the age of 4 years, focused on the situation of harm in judging that the pretend crying had elicited the onlooker's prosocial behavior, whereas older children, around the age of 5 years, focused on the expresser's emotion (sadness) and the onlooker's empathy in judging that the pretend crying had elicited the prosocial behavior.
This result suggests that 5-year-olds are more likely to have insight into others' minds when they consider the onlooker's response to the pretend crier, whereas younger children pay attention to pronounced situational cues. This finding is consistent with those of previous studies suggesting that younger children's moral judgments are determined by an action's outcome rather than by an actor's state of mind (e.g., his/her intention), whereas older children show greater sensitivity to intention (Karniol, 1978; Nelson, 1980; Yuill & Perner, 1988; Zelazo, Helwig, & Lau, 1996) . Thus, older preschool children may be more likely to consider others' minds when they morally evaluate pretend crying.
Moral judgment relies on understanding of mental state. The link between lying or deception and theory of mind (the ability to make inferences about other people's minds, including their false beliefs) has attracted much interest among researchers (cf. Chandler et al., 1989; Hala, Chandler, & Fritz, 1991; Lewis, 1993; Lewis, Stranger, & Sullivan, 1989; Peskin, 1992; Polak & Harris, 1999) . At around 6 years of age, children become clearly aware of the deception associated with false verbal and facial emotional expressions (Gross & Harris, 1988) . Children also become able to pass false-belief tasks at about the same age (Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001 ; see also Naito & Koyama, 2006 , on Japanese children's theory of mind).
Previous studies have suggested that theory of mind plays an important role in both children's lying behavior and their ability to understand lying-related expressions. For example, Talwar, Gordon, and Lee (2007) examined 6-to 11-year-olds' lie-telling behavior and found that children's ability to maintain their deceptions was positively correlated with their second-order false-belief scores. With regard to the understanding of false emotional expressions related to lying, Banerjee and Yuill (1999) found that children's performance on a second-order false-belief task was associated with their understanding of self-presentational false emotional displays. Mizokawa and Koyasu (2007) also found an association between 4-to 6-year-olds' understanding of protagonists' pretend crying after the latter's toy was hidden and children's performance on first-and second-order false belief tasks. These associations between children's lying (both behavior and understanding) and their development of theory of mind may stem from the nature of false expressions (i.e., lies, apparent emotions), which entails the possibility that the person viewing the false expressions will be deceived and adopt false beliefs.
How, then, does children's understanding of mental states relate to their moral judgments about pretend crying? Given the previous findings (e.g., Karniol, 1978; Nelson, 1980) , it is expected that understanding another person's mind may also play a key role when children make moral judgments about pretend crying. In this study, we examined children's moral judgments using two stories based on Mizokawa's (2011a) pretend-crying tasks. With respect to the understanding of mental states, we focused on understandings of false beliefs and hidden emotions due to the nature of pretend crying (i.e., it can lead to false beliefs about the expresser's actual emotions, as the expresser is hiding his/her actual, internal, emotions).
In the harm story used for the pretend-crying task, in which the protagonist decides to pretend to cry after being bumped by another character, the ability to understand the protagonist's intention to control his/her emotional expression is important when children judge the moral value of the expression. In the harm-free context, where the two story characters do not share knowledge of the cause of pretend crying (i.e., the fact that the protagonist decides to pretend to cry because s/he wants to get the pencil from another character), both an understanding of the protagonist's intention to control his/her emotional expression and an awareness of the deceptive aspect of the behavior (i.e., that pretend crying leads onlookers to adopt false beliefs) may be important when children judge the moral value of the expression. Therefore, the pretend crying in both the harm and the harm-free stories may be judged as bad when children have a better understanding of false emotional expression (i.e., that people can express false emotion on purpose). On the other hand, only the pretend crying in the harm-free story is likely to be judged as bad when children have a better understanding of others' false beliefs.
In this study, we tested two hypotheses about the relationship between moral judgments about pretend crying and understanding mental states: 1) children with a more advanced theory of mind are likely to judge that pretend crying in a harm-free story is bad; and 2) children with a better understanding of hidden emotions are likely to judge that pretend crying in both kinds of stories (harm, harm-free) is bad. To focus on moral judgment, we selected 6-year-old children as participants in this study because it has been found that most children at around this age are able to successfully differentiate pretend crying from real crying.
METHOD

Participants
Thirty-three 6-year-old Japanese children (18 males, 15 females, M = 6.04 years, range = 5.42-6.50, SD = .33) participated in this study. The participants were recruited from a primary school and a nursery school located in the central area of Kyoto City, Japan; all were native Japanese speakers. Informed consent was obtained from the children's mother through their school teachers. Although detailed demographic descriptions of the children could not be obtained because of the school's privacy policy, they were primarily from middle-class families.
Procedures and Measures
The children were tested individually by the experimenter (first author) in a quiet room at their school. They were given pretend-crying tasks, false-belief tasks, hidden emotion tasks, and a vocabulary test. The order of study tasks was counterbalanced across participants.
Pretend-crying tasks. Two picture-based stories were developed to examine children's moral judgments about pretend crying. The pretend-crying tasks included two stories, a harm story and a harm-free story.
In the harm story, the protagonist pretended to cry after the other character accidentally bumped her. In the harm-free story, the protagonist pretended to cry because of a purely personal motivation (the desire to obtain a nicer pencil).
In each story, the children were asked about the following: whether the protagonist was or was not actually crying (Q1: reality); how they thought the other character would respond to the crying protagonist (the children selected one of the following three choices orally or by pointing to a picture: prosocial behavior [saying to the protagonist, "Are you okay? Don't cry."], denial [saying to the protagonist, "You look like a crybaby."], or non-involvement [saying nothing to the protagonist] (Q2: the other character's behavior); and whether the crying behavior of the protagonist was "good," "bad," or "just all right" (Q3: moral judgment). Stories and questions for the pretend-crying tasks are presented in Appendix 1. The forced choices within each question were counterbalanced for each child.
Theory of mind tasks. Children's theory of mind was assessed via four stories (cf. Hughes et al., 2000; Hughes, Ensor, & Marks, 2011) . These included two first-order false-belief tasks (Harris, Johnson, Hutton, Andrews, & Cooke, 1989) and two second-order false-belief tasks (Perner & Wimmer, 1985; Sullivan, Zaitchik, & Tager-Flusberg, 1994) .
In the first-order false-belief tasks, participants were shown puppet-based stories that involved a nice surprise and a nasty surprise. In each story, object X (e.g., a pear), which is in a container (e.g., a lunchbox), is replaced with object Y (e.g., an apple) without the protagonist's knowledge, but the participants themselves always knew the true content. The participants were required to answer memory control questions (e.g., "How does Saru-san feel when he gets a pear?" "How does Saru-san feel when he gets an apple?"), a firstorder false-belief question (e.g., "What does Saru-san think is in the box, an apple or a pear?"), and a reality question (e.g., "What is in the box really, an apple or a pear?"). Fig. 1 . Pictures used in the pretend-crying tasks (left: harm story; right: harm-free story). The pictures at the top were used when telling the story to the participants, and the pictures at the bottom were used in Question 2.
In the second-order false belief tasks, participants were shown picture-based stories. In each story, character X hides something (e.g., a birthday surprise) from character Y and deceives him/her by telling a lie. However, character Y accidentally discovers the truth. Character X is unaware of this discovery and mistakenly assumes that character Y still holds the original false belief. Participants were asked to answer a first-order false-belief question (e.g., "What did Kouta think he was getting for his birthday?"), a reality question (e.g., "What was his Mum giving him really?"), a second-order false-belief question (e.g., "What does Mum say to Granny?"), and memory control questions (e.g., "Did Mum see Kouta go into the shed?"). Examples of the first-and second-order false-belief tasks are presented in Appendix 2.
Hidden emotion tasks. The children's comprehension of hidden emotions was assessed with component 7 (hiding) of the Test of Emotion Comprehension (TEC; Pons & Harris, 2000) . The children were read four picture-based stories and asked to attribute an emotion to a character who was motivated to hide his or her real emotion from another child and express a different emotion. These four stories included two about hidden positive emotion (the protagonist hid a positive emotion and expressed a sad or neutral emotion) and two about hidden negative emotion (the protagonist hid a negative emotion and expressed a happy emotion). In component 7 of the TEC, the children were asked to attribute an emotion to characters in each of the four stories (i.e., "How is Sakura really feeling inside? Is she feeling happy, cross, just alright, or sad?"). An example of the hidden emotion task is presented in Appendix 3.
Vocabulary test. The children's verbal ability was assessed using the receptive vocabulary test from the Wechsler Preschool and Primary Scale of Intelligence-third edition (WPPSI-III; Wechsler, 2003) .
RESULTS
Scoring
Moral judgments about pretend crying. In terms of the reality question (Q1), the answer "not (actually) crying" was treated as correct because it was a sign of the children's ability to distinguish between pretense and reality. In terms of the question about the other character's behavior (Q2), the choices (prosocial behavior, denial, and non-involvement) were treated as categorical. For the moral judgment question (Q3), children were given two points when they judged that the protagonist's action (pretend crying or crying), was bad, 1 point when they judged it to be just all right, and 0 points when they judged it to be good.
Theory-of-mind tasks. The children's responses to the two first-order false-belief tasks were judged as correct when they answered all four questions correctly (a first-order false-belief question, a reality question, and two memory questions). Each of the two second-order false-belief tasks included first-and second-order false-belief questions, a reality question, and two memory control questions. The first-order theory of mind score was obtained by summing the scores across the four tasks (range: 0-4). The children's understanding of second-order false beliefs was indexed by summing the scores across the two second-order false-belief tasks (range: 0-2). The total theory of mind score was obtained by summing the first-order scores and the second-order scores (range: 0-6).
Hidden emotion tasks. Component 7 of the TEC requires children to attribute an emotion to characters in four stories. Participants were given 1 point if they attributed the appropriate emotion to each story character, and total scores ranged from 0 to 4.
Vocabulary test. Raw scores on the receptive vocabulary test of the WPPSI-III were converted to scaled scores using a set of norms (potential scores ranged from 0 to 20). Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for each study measure. We found no significant sex differences for any of the study measures (n.s.).
Children's responses in the pretend-crying tasks
With regard to the central question of this study, whether children's moral judgments about pretend crying can be explained by their understanding of mental states, we predicted that children with a more sophisticated theory of mind would judge the pretend crying in the harm-free story as bad, whereas children with a more advanced understanding of hidden emotions would judge the pretend crying in both stories as bad. Initially, we checked how children responded to the questions in each pretend-crying story.
Understanding of and response to pretend crying (Q1). All 33 children responded to the reality question correctly, answering that the protagonist in both stories had not actually been crying. In other words, they all successfully distinguished pretend crying from real crying. This result is consistent with previous studies showing that children of about 6 years of age could recognize pretend crying (Mizokawa, 2011b; Mizokawa & Koyasu, 2007) .
Judgments about the onlooker's response to the pretend crier (Q2). All 33 children selected prosocial behavior (i.e., saying "Are you okay? Don't cry.") as the response to the pretend crier in the harm story. In the harm-free story, all but one child selected prosocial behavior. Although the percentage of children who selected prosocial behavior in each of the two stories was higher than the percentage of the 5-year-olds who did so in the previous study (Mizokawa, 2011a) , our result is consistent with the earlier study in that children of about 5 or 6 years of age did not base their decision about whether to select prosocial behavior on situational cues alone (i.e., harm or harm-free).
Moral judgments about pretend crying (Q3). Twenty-one of 33 children (64%) judged the pretend crying as bad, and 12 children (36%) judged it as just all right in the harm story. Twenty-two of 33 children (67%) judged the pretend crying as bad, 10 children (30%) judged it as just all right, and one child (3%) judged it as good in the harmfree story.
Association between moral judgments and understanding of mental states
Next, we examined associations between the children's moral judgments about pretend crying in each story and their understanding of mental states. Correlation and partial correlation coefficients between various pairs of measures were calculated. We controlled for verbal ability (WPPSI score) in the partial correlation analyses, as this measure was significantly correlated with theory of mind scores, r = .56, p = .001. Table 2 shows the correlation and partial correlation coefficients for the relationship between moral judgments about pretend crying and understanding of mental states after controlling for verbal ability.
Moral judgments about pretend crying in the harm story and understanding of mental states. We found a significant correlation between moral judgments about pretend crying in the harm story and children's understanding of hidden emotions, r = .37, p = .032, and a significant partial correlation when verbal ability was partialled out, r = .39, p = .026.
Moral judgments about pretend crying in the harm-free story and understanding of mental states. We found significant correlations between moral judgments about pretend crying in the harm-free story and theory of mind scores, r = .43, p = .013. Significant partial correlations were also found between these variables when verbal ability was partialled out, r = .43, p = .015.
Does understanding mental states contribute to moral judgments about pretend crying?
We then directly examined our central hypothesis using multiple regression analysis. The moral judgment score about the pretend crying in the harm story was entered as the dependent variable. Given that verbal ability was significantly correlated with theory of mind scores, verbal ability was entered in Step 1 as a control variable, and it was not significantly related to moral judgments, R 2 = .02, F(1, 31) = .58, p = .454. Next, theory of mind and hidden emotion scores were entered in Step 2. As shown in Table 3, Step 2 explained 20% of the variance, F(3, 29) = 2.36, p = .092. We found that the hidden emotion score independently contributed to moral judgments about pretend crying in the harm story, β = .39, p = .029. We performed the same regression analyses on moral judgments in the harm-free story. Moral-judgment scores were entered as the dependent variable. Verbal ability, which was entered in Step 1, was not significantly related to Note. The upper off-diagonal elements represent correlation coefficients, whereas the lower off-diagonal elements represent partial correlation coefficients after controlling for verbal ability (WPPSI score). * p < .05.
moral judgments, R 2 = .02, F(1, 31) = .66, p = .425. Theory of mind and hidden emotion scores were entered in Step 2, which explained 24% of the variance, F(3, 29) = 2.97, p = .048. The results showed that theory of mind was a significant predictor of moral judgments about pretend crying in the harm-free story, β = .50, p = .016.
DISCUSSION
This study addressed how the understanding of mental states relates to children's moral judgments about pretend crying. The results revealed that children's moral judgments about pretend crying in two stories (harm, harm-free) were related to their understanding of mental states (false beliefs, hidden emotions).
In response to each of the two stories, some children judged that the pretend crying was bad, whereas others judged that it was not bad. These results indicate that young children do not regard pretend crying as a socially desirable form of expression, although, like infants and toddlers, some preschoolers may pretend to cry to get another's attention and to elicit caring behavior (Buss & Kiel, 2004; Reddy, 1991) . The association between children's understanding of mental states and their moral judgment provides a framework for considering how children use information about mental states in their evaluations of another's pretend crying.
We investigated whether children's theory of mind scores were related to their moral judgment about pretend crying. The pretend crier in the harm-free story was personally motivated to change the other person's behavior, whereas the pretend crier in the harm story used crying as an appeal or exaggerated signal of having been harmed. Both expressers appeared to be actually crying, which could lead the onlooker to conclude that the pretend crier was indeed crying and feeling sad. The results revealed that children's theory of mind scores were significantly correlated with and predicted their moral judgments only in the harm-free story; we found no association between these variables in the harm story. Moreover, the regression analyses also demonstrated that theory of mind was the only variable that contributed to moral judgment with regard to the harm-free story (see Table 3 ). Overall, the results support our first hypothesis, that children with a more advanced theory of mind judge pretend crying as bad only in a harm-free story with an embedded deceptive element.
We also tested whether children with a better understanding of hidden emotions judged the pretend crying in both stories to be bad. The results partly supported our second hypothesis in that we found a relationship between the scores for understanding hidden emotions and moral judgment with regard to the harm story. Contrary to our expectations, we found no significant association between these variables in the harm-free story. The regression analyses also suggested that understanding hidden emotion was the only variable that contributed to moral judgments in the harm story (see Table 3 ). The different associations between hidden emotion and moral judgments in the two stories can be interpreted as follows. The protagonist's reason for appealing to another person using pretend crying was obvious in the story involving harm. In contrast, in the harm-free story, the children needed to focus on the protagonist's inner motivation in pretending to cry because there was no obvious reason for doing so (i.e., harm). Thus, when the young children judged the moral value (good-bad) of pretend crying, a behavioral aspect (control, exaggeration) of the crying may have been highlighted in the harm story, whereas the motivational aspect of the pretend crying may have been highlighted in the harm-free story. Our results are consistent with previous findings showing that children of around 6 years of age can evaluate identical actions differently depending on the actor's motives (Baird & Astington, 2004) .
In summary, the results of this study revealed that young children's awareness of mental states is associated with their moral judgments about pretend crying in different contexts in different ways. Our findings should help to connect several research areas, including emotional development (cf. Harris et al., 1986; Saarni, 1999) , theory of mind (cf. Perner & Wimmer, 1985; Premack & Woodruff, 1978; Wimmer & Perner, 1983) , and moral reasoning (cf. Piaget, 1932 Piaget, /1965 . Although further research is needed to reveal the inner thought processes underlying children's moral judgments about pretend crying, their answers to the post hoc questions about the reasons for their moral judgments provide us with several clues in this regard.
It is noteworthy that it is not easy for young children to talk about their thought processes. However, when the experimenter asked them to justify their moral judgments, some children referred to important aspects of pretend crying, such as its factuality (e.g., "It is not real crying. It is just pretend"), its deceptive nature (e.g., "The other person will be deceived"), its influence on the onlooker's feelings (e.g., "It may surprise the friend"), and the expresser's desire (e.g., "He wants his friend to lend him the blue pencil"). Interestingly, one child who judged the pretend crying in the harm-free story as bad explained the reason for his judgment as follows: "[It is bad because] he (the protagonist) tried to get the pencil by using pretend crying. He should not be afraid to ask 'Can I borrow your pencil?'" This suggests that children around this age have gradually acquired language that is sophisticated enough to convey their desires and emotions to other people and that they have begun using language instead of direct emotional expression.
Empirical evidence suggests that mothers play a critical role in directly and indirectly socializing their children to regulate emotion (see Eisenberg, Cumberland, & Spinrad, 1998) . Children eventually learn display rules through this socialization process. One of these rules is to control their sadness in the presence of peers (cf. Zeman & Garber, 1996) . At an early age, they also learn the moral judgment attached to lying (Bussey, 1992 (Bussey, , 1999 Peterson, et al., 1983) . Note that pretend crying and the expression of false sadness are not identical to lying. Although pretend crying is not actual crying and is similar to lying in that regard, pretend crying also serves a function that is essential for survival in a child's early years, that is, attracting others' attention and eliciting caring behavior from them. Future research is needed to elucidate mothers' changing expectations regarding their children's regulation of emotion (especially negative emotions) as their children age and its association with children's judgments about pretend and actual crying. Furthermore, it remains unclear whether children who judged the pretend crying to be bad avoided using pretend crying themselves. Investigations examining associations of children's moral judgments with adults' expectations, children's behavior, and children's understanding of false emotional expressions should provide additional valuable information about the emotional and cognitive development of children.
